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Since at least 1983, when Robert Cover gave us Nomos and Narrative,1
and probably as early as James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination,2 we
have been on notice that the law has stories.3 I am not referring to the fact
that clients have stories. We have long known that client stories are crucial
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las
Vegas. I am especially grateful to Tony Amsterdam, Jerome Bruner, and the other faculty at
the Persuasion Institute, where so many rich conversations have deepened my understanding
of narratives in law. This particular project has been further improved by comments from a
set of generous readers, including Linda Berger, Dan Edwards, Lynne Henderson, Bill Krier,
Joan Magat, Jay Mootz, Teresa Phelps, Terrill Pollman, David Ritchie, Jack Lee Sammons,
Elaine Shoben, Kathy Stanchi, James Boyd White, and Steven Winter. These kind readers
are innocent of all mistakes and errors of judgment that may remain. I am grateful to
American University’s Washington College of Law for inviting me to speak at its 2007 Law
and Rhetoric Conference, where I first presented on this topic. I also want to thank the
conference attendees of the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Law,
Culture & the Humanities, Brown University, the Rocky Mountain Legal Writing
Conference, Arizona State University College of Law, and the law faculties of the Boyd
School of Law, the University of Nevada Las Vegas, Mercer University, Seattle University,
the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, and the University of Arizona, whose comments have
proven extraordinarily helpful.
1. Robert M. Cover, Forward Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983)
(“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it
and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. . .
. In this normative world, law and narrative are inseparably related.”).
2. See generally, JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE
OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973) (a text applying literary concepts and criticism
to legal language and culture).
3. Over the years, we have been given further notice of the law’s stories. See
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000); MILNER S. BALL,
LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY (1985); L. H. LARUE,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995);
STEVEN L.WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001) [hereinafter
WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST]. But despite the work of these great minds, the law’s own
stories still are seldom explored.
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in litigation.4 Lawyers and judges hear, transform, and re-present those
stories in fact statements of briefs and judicial opinions.5 But later in those
same documents, lawyers and judges also tell stories about the law itself.6
In discussions of cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions, there are
stories of birth, death, battle, betrayal, tricksters, and champions.7 In fact,
we may not be able to talk about these sources of law without telling stories
about them. These stories do their narrative work beneath the surface of
routine law talk and lead straight to the conclusions that become the law.8
Discussions of law do not sound like stories, of course.9 They state an
issue, cite authority, and purport to rely on a legal rule. But when we talk
about legal authority, using the logical forms of rules and their bedfellows
of analogy, policy, and principle, we are actually swimming in a sea of
narrative, oblivious to the water around us. It is not surprising that we have
failed to consider that narrative pervades the analysis of legal authorities.10
As the old Buddhist saying goes, we don’t know who discovered the ocean,
but it probably wasn’t a fish.11
This article teases out several familiar myths often hidden in
discussions of legal authority. These myths are simultaneously true and
false, world shaping, yet always incomplete.12 The choice of which stories
we tell about the law matters greatly.13 Why? Because we seldom question
familiar narratives, and these myths practically run in our veins.14 We
would be wise to learn to recognize and interrogate these stories, attuned to
their truths, alert to their limitations, and ready, when necessary, to seek
other more accurate and complete stories for the law.15
4. See generally Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension].
5. See Linda Holdeman Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic
Imaginations in Legal Discourse, 20 LEGAL STUDIES FORUM 7, 9 (1996).
6. See generally LARUE, supra note 3, at 20. I do not mean to imply that client
stories and the stories of the law are unrelated. They should always be at least consistent
with each other, and they are often quite closely related, as in the two briefs examined here.
7. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113.
8. See LARUE, supra note 3, at 19–21.
9. See Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L.
REV. 681, 681 (1994), reprinted in 6 J. ALWD 88 (Fall 2009).
10. See id. at 682.
11. See Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1,
4 (1991).
12. See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 689.
13. See id. at 690 (citations omitted).
14. See WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 105–06.
15. See LARUE, supra note 3, at 20. Peter Brooks has called for just such a study of
legal narratology. See Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a
Narratology? 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–3 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks, Narrative
Transaction].
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A word about the texts for this inquiry: Rhetorical analysis often
examines judicial opinions, and looks at how a judge influenced law’s
development by the way the opinion was written.16 But if rhetorical analysis
is limited to judicial opinions, it starts at least one step too late, missing a
critical point of influence.17 To fully understand the rhetorical situation,
rhetorical analysis should start with the advocates’ briefs.18 In keeping with
that goal, the following pages will explore the birth story from the
Petitioner’s Brief in Miranda v. Arizona19 and then the rescue story from
the Respondent’s Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick.20 The final section of the
article will compare the different ways that these two stories function and
identify some fundamental questions raised by the idea that narrative plays
an important, but hidden, role in shaping our view of legal authority. First,
though, it will be helpful to review some basic concepts about story
structures, cultural myths, and how metaphor works when we think about
law.

16. That was, for instance, LaRue’s rhetorical project in analyzing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). LARUE,
supra note 3, at 7. But see, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 9, at 681–83.
17. See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 711.
18. For example, it has been said that the Miranda opinion was “the moment when
[Chief Justice Warren] invents what one might call the story of the closed room.” Peter
Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature, in LAW’S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 114, 116 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear]. But the credit for the invention of the
“closed room story” as it was used in Miranda actually belongs to John Paul Frank, who
wrote Ernesto Miranda’s brief and whose effective use of the closed room story Chief
Justice Warren adopted. See brief cited infra note 19, at *22. The closed room story, in fact,
predates even Miranda’s case. For instance, in 1951, Justice Douglas wrote “What happens
behind doors that are opened and closed at the sole discretion of the police is a black chapter
in every country . . . .” United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). In 1957, Justice Black wrote, “Behind closed doors [the defendant] can be
coerced, tricked or confused by officers into making statements which may be untrue or
[misleading]. While the witness is in the custody of the interrogators, as a practical matter,
he is subject to their uncontrolled will.” In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 341–42 (1957) (Black,
J., dissenting). Perhaps the point here is that storytelling is rarely a matter of invention; it
almost always draws on stories that have been told before.
19. Brief for Petitioner, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 65-759), 1966
WL 100543. Because few readers will have access to the pagination of the original brief
filed with the Court, citations to the brief will be made to the Westlaw document. Further,
for ease of reading and better focus on the narrative moves, quotations from the briefs here
will sometimes omit internal citations.
20. Brief for Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 85-140),
1986 WL 720442. Because few readers will have access to the pagination of the original
brief filed with the Court, citations to the brief will be to the Westlaw document. Further, for
ease of reading and better focus on the narrative moves, quotations from the briefs here will
sometimes omit internal citations.
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STORIES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS
We have known for some time that stories are among the primary ways
of making sense of the world, including the world of law.21 A story’s two
most important components for doing this formative work are character and
plot.22 At the very least, a story needs a protagonist, an antagonist, 23 and a
difficult challenge to overcome.24 Something important must be happening.
There must be some narrative movement from an inadequate state of affairs
to a resolution of that inadequacy, taking place over a period of time.25
One classic plot structure begins with a struggle toward a specific
goal.26 Right from the opening scene, the world (or at least the protagonist’s
world) needs fixing or lacks something important.27 Journey stories, for
example, often use this structure.28 The opening scene may find the
protagonist far from home, facing a long journey. Homer’s epic poem, The
Odyssey, is a prototypical example.29 As the story begins, Troy has just
fallen, and the warrior Odysseus is standing on the distant shore, ready to
return home.30 The story describes his struggles as he undertakes the tenyear journey back home to Ithaca and to his family there.31
21. Bruner, supra note 11, at 4, 10. See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 681–695, for an
excellent sampling of both recent and ancient writing on the subject, Narrative is intricately
related and even foundational to more formal reasoning using rules, analogies, and policies.
See Edwards, supra note 5, at 9. When we are presented with a new normative legal
question, we imagine the prototypical story in which it would arise. See id. at 11. From that
narrative platform, we construct the rules and standards to make that story and future similar
stories end the way we think they should. See id. at 13.
22. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113 (emphasis omitted) (A narrative
“needs a cast of human-like characters, beings capable of willing their own actions, forming
intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings. It also needs a plot with a beginning, a middle,
and an end, in which particular characters are involved in particular events.”); see also
LARUE, supra note 3, at 133 (relying on Kenneth Burke’s well-known pentad: “the actor, the
act, the scene, the instrument, and the goal”).
23. The antagonist might not be a character in the sense that Amsterdam and Bruner
define it, that is, a person or entity with feelings, intentions, and will. See AMSTERDAM &
BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113. The antagonist could be a natural resistance or force, such as
fire, flood, storm, draught, disease or entropy. See generally, Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension, supra note 4, at 2237–40.
24. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2237.
25. Id. at 2239–40.
26. See, e.g., id. at 2236.
27. See id. at 2237.
28. See id.
29. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 1 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1998).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2. Another example is the story of the Israelites’ journey to return to
Abraham’s homeland, told in Exodus. Modern incarnations are Gene Roddenberry’s
television series, Star Trek: Voyager, where captain and crew find themselves 70,000 lightyears from Earth and must make the long journey home. Star Trek: Voyager (UPN television
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In other stories using this structure, the task is to make the world right
somehow. The situation could call for creating an important new tool or
idea. The existing problem could be in the protagonist’s own life or in the
lives of others. For instance, the opening scene of the Steven Spielberg film
AMISTAD finds Cinque in the hold of a slave ship, using his bloody fingers
to pry out a nail from a wooden plank.32 The movie tells the story of his
struggle for freedom, with assistance along the way from a former slave, a
New England lawyer, and John Quincy Adams, the former President.33
The structural characteristic common to these stories is that, from the
beginning, there is something to be done. The story begins in
incompleteness, distress, or disarray, and the goal is the completion of an
important task or the restoration of the normative world. As the story
progresses, a reader will be watching the struggle and rooting for the
protagonists as they try to reach their destination or complete their project.34
In another common plot structure, the key characteristic of the story’s
opening scene is its normality and stability.35 The world is not incomplete
and life is more or less as it should be.36 However, this initially stable world
enters a stage of disequilibrium.37 Amsterdam and Bruner refer to this as a
“steady state” followed by “trouble.”38 The steady state is, by definition,
legitimate—the legitimate ordinary.39 In narrative terms, whatever disrupts
a steady state is bad.40 The story describes the struggle to resolve the
disequilibrium and return to some version of legitimate stability—either to
the original steady state (restoration) or to some other good and stable place

broadcasts 1995–2001); see also DEREK WALCOTT, OMEROS (1990) (an epic poem where
after many trans-Atlantic journeys, the narrator returns to a home he now sees in new ways).
32. AMISTAD (DreamWorks 1997).
33. Id. Other modern film examples include PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993), the
story of a lawyer’s efforts to apply antidiscrimination laws for the protection of employees
with HIV/AIDS; the film NORMA RAE (20th Century Fox 1979), the story of a cotton mill
worker who successfully unionized the mill where she worked. Stories can include both
journeys and other kinds of struggles, as does AMISTAD’S telling both of Cinque’s struggle
for freedom and his journey back to his home in Africa. See AMISTAD, supra note 32.
34. See Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2236–37.
35. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 114.
38. Id. at 113–14.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 114. A steady state/trouble/resolution structure is inherently conservative,
making the unstated assumption that life is pretty much as it should be. But when the
protagonist is in trouble from the very beginning, the story is inherently calling for change,
with an implicit assumption that things need fixing. See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 713–14.
The power of these assumptions lies in their implication rather than direct assertion. See id.
Without meeting any kind of a burden of proof, they become the way we see the situation.
See id. at 714.
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(transformation).41 In Murder on the Orient Express, Hercule Poirot boards
a train in Istanbul.42 The train proceeds normally along the scheduled
journey until the second night, when a murder occurs.43 Poirot undertakes to
solve the murder.44 In the end, rough justice is done, and the lives of Poirot
and the passengers proceed as we are meant to think they should.45
Client stories easily lend themselves to such plot structures.46 For
instance, in Bowers v. Hardwick, Michael Hardwick was safely at home
(the steady state). 47 The police entered his home, and he was arrested under
Georgia’s sodomy law (the trouble).48 By enforcing a Right to Privacy49,
the United States Supreme Court can return Hardwick to the safety and
sanctity of his home (the restoration).50
But the law has such stories, too. Just like any other story, the law’s
story will need characters, a plot, and perhaps a prop here and there.
Metaphor can help provide all of these elements of the story.51 As Lakoff
41. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113–14. See generally Kenneth D.
Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 LEGAL WRITING 127 (2008)
(providing an interesting application of this story structure to a legal brief).
42. AGATHA CHRISTIE, MURDER ON THE ORIENT EXPRESS, 10 (Dodd, Mead &
Company 1934).
43. Id. at 45.
44. Id. at 49.
45. Id. at 253–54. Although, perhaps, the law would have dictated a different result. A
film example is PATRIOT GAMES (Paramount Pictures 1992), which finds Jack Ryan
peacefully in London with his family when he witnesses a terrorist attack. Id. Ryan
intervenes to kill one of the terrorists, but the terrorist’s brother vows revenge. Id. Ryan and
his family are attacked several times until, finally, Ryan kills the attackers. Id.
46. Chestek, supra note 41; Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and
Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 790–91 (2006) (stating that any client, as the
hero on his or her journey, follows a similar path).
47. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986).
48. Id.
49. The capitalization here is meant to reflect a mythical status approaching divinity in
the sense of the Greek or Roman gods—in other words, as one god among many others (and
by analogy, one important constitutional right among many other important constitutional
rights).
50. After Hardwick’s arrest, Attorney General Michael Bowers decided not to proceed
with prosecution, but Hardwick remained vulnerable both to prosecution on the original
charge and to further police invasions of his home. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.
51. The study of metaphor is at least as old as Aristotle and spans at least the
disciplines of philosophy, linguistics, literary criticism, law, cognitive psychology, and
rhetoric. See generally THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2332–36 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
1984) (Aristotle discusses metaphor in THE POETICS, his explanation of literary theory);
Michael R. Smith, LEVELS OF METAPHOR IN PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING, 58 MERCER L.
REV. 919, 919–20 (noting that law and metaphor have recently been studied in “linguistics,
philosophy, rhetoric, cognitive psychology, and literary theory”). Here, we will rely on more
modern work in linguistics and cognitive studies.
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and Johnson have demonstrated, we think about abstract ideas in
metaphors.52 When we think about a legal theory or a statute or the holding
of a case, we think about it metaphorically, as if it were a sentient being or a
concrete thing.53 Lakoff and Johnson would doubt that we can think about a
legal theory or a case holding in any other way.54 Ideas are grounded in
concrete physical experience and cannot otherwise exist.55 This
understanding of metaphor reveals something important about the law’s
stories: Characters can be entities, like courts or legislatures or prosecutors’
offices, or even abstract concepts, like a principle or a policy, a statute or a
case holding.56 There may be characters in a legal discussion after all, and
those characters may be doing something—something that might amount to
a plot.57
One other concept—myth—will help with both characters and plot. The
term “myth” has been used in a variety of ways with a variety of
definitions. Here I use it to mean, particularly, an archetype or other master
story.58 Myths or archetypes may be simply cultural, soaked up by living in
a particular place and time, or they may be encoded at birth. For this
article’s purposes, their origin and possible universality matter little.59
52. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 47 (1980).
For instance, “ideas are people:” They can give birth to other ideas, die, and be resurrected.
Id. “Ideas are plants:” They can be planted, bloom, come to fruition, produce offshoots, and
be fertile or barren. Id. “Ideas are products:” We can produce them, refine them, and churn
them out at a rapid rate. Id. “Ideas are commodities:” We can package them, buy and sell
them, value them, and offer them in the intellectual marketplace. Id. at 47–48. “Ideas are
resources:” We can run out of them, waste them, pool them, invest them. Id. at 48.
53. See WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 18–19 (noting that “the
underlying metaphor . . . conceptualizes ideas as objects”).
54. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 3.
55. Id.
56. Normally, a character must be capable of will, emotion, and intention.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113. There are exceptions, however; the antagonist
might be a natural resistance or force. See supra note 23. We will see another example in the
Respondent’s Brief in Bowers v. Hardwick, where the right to privacy plays the role of a key
character. See infra text accompanying notes 177 and 130–142. In fact, will and emotion
may be considered secondary phenomena. The metaphorical personification is what counts.
See WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 127–28.
57. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 25 (“Once we can identify our experiences
as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify
them . . . .”). I would add that we can tell stories about them, as well.
58. Archetype and myth have been studied particularly in literary criticism, depth
psychology, and anthropology. See, e.g., JAMES G. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY
IN MAGIC AND RELIGION 412 (abr. ed. 1940) (studying personification of corn as a goddess in
various cultures); NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 136 (1957) (studying archetypes
in the literary world); C.G. JUNG, THE ARCHETYPES AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 4–5,
(R.F.C. Hull trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 1980) (1934) (studying archetypes as
having existed since primordial unconscious).
59. The difference would matter more if the reader and the writer did not share a
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Either way, by the time we are old enough to think about law, myths have
become part of us, and they are ready to orchestrate our understanding of
the world, including the world of law.60
Myths provide ready templates for plots.61 Myths and narrative
archetypes such as birth, death, re-birth, journey and sacrifice establish a
particular view, a narrative perspective on the events of a story, creating the
context in which ideas or events will be interpreted.62 We carry the
blueprints of these archetypal situations, and when events activate those
archetypes, we create at least the rough outlines of a particular mythological
story through which we view those events.63 In other words, we mentally
create an archetypal plot line. Myth, too, provides a ready stock of
characters to “people” those plots with champions, children, tricksters,
mentors, kings, mothers, demons, and sages.64 These character templates
also stand ready, inviting us to cast both people and things in particular
archetypal roles.65
To summarize: If the law is to have a story, it needs at least characters
and a plot. But, because we think metaphorically, the story’s characters can
include institutions or reified ideas, and these institutions or ideas may be
doing things that constitute a plot. Nor are we left adrift to create a plot or
common cultural heritage.
60. Scholars of cognitive science have long known that human perception is largely
an act of construction, during which the brain both interprets new stimuli in the context of
pre-existing knowledge and actively fills in missing information by inferences based on
existing knowledge. We expect to see X, and, therefore, we see X. See, e.g., ELLEN WINNER,
INVENTED WORLDS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ARTS 108 (1982) (“For contructivist theory,
perception of what a picture represents depends upon cognitive construction: perceivers
must piece together the cues, using their knowledge of either the world or the
representational conventions of their culture.”). For additional material on relevant principles
of cognitive science, see Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . . The
Use of Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. RICH. L. REV.
1213, 1217 (2010) and Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial
Exploration, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 411, 412 (2006).
61. Master stories and metaphors both function as embedded knowledge structures.
Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 269 (2009). Myths and other master stories provide a ready
stock of symbols as well, such as Snow White’s poison apple. Miranda’s Interrogation
Room 2, for instance, may function as such a symbol. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
62. See, e.g., WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 128 (The hero’s
journey provides the templates with which “we actively engage in the contrivances of plot
and character necessary to make the story work.”).
63. Id.
64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
65. Archetypes can operate in the surface story that prompted the litigation as well.
See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 46, at 772 (suggesting that lawyers develop narratives by
casting their clients as archetypal heroes).
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cast the characters. Instead, we are programmed with mythological plots
and characters, and we are inclined to see both events and ideas as fitting
into those archetypal stories. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this
process of story creation is usually unconscious, which makes its operations
all the more significant.66 If we are not aware that we are inside a story, we
cannot decide to step out of it long enough to ask whether there might be
other possible stories and whether those other stories might make better
sense of the situation. 67
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA AS A CREATION OR BIRTH STORY
With these basic concepts of myth and metaphor in mind, it is time to
ask what kind of characters and plots the law can have. This article will
consider two common archetypes about the law: birth and rescue.68 We
begin with the birth story told in the Petitioner’s Brief to the Supreme Court
of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona.69
Ernesto Miranda was brought to police headquarters and taken into
Interrogation Room 2.70 The door was closed, and he was alone with two
officers.71 Two hours later he emerged, having signed a confession.72 At
66. Because the process of story creation is usually unconscious, readers believe that
their perceptions are their own ideas, not an idea someone else (the writer) is pressing upon
them. The persuasive effect of such unconscious perception is far greater than the persuasive
effect of an expressly stated thesis. Higdon, supra note 60, at 1225; Frank R. Kardes,
Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising: The Effects of Conclusion Omission and
Involvement on Persuasion, 15 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 225, 225 (1988); Stanchi, supra note
60, at 422.
67. The operation of cultural myths and archetypes in human perception is consistent
with schema theory in cognitive science. See generally JUNG, supra note 58, at 5–6 (using
the example of primitive tribal lore that tradition has changed over time from the
unconscious to “conscious formulae”). A schema is an underlying conceptual framework
composed of a cluster of facts or ideas that have been associated together and stored in
memory as a unit. Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Dolores Albarracín, Belief Formation,
Organization, and Change: Cognitive and Motivational Influences, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ATTITUDES 273, 280 (Dolores Albarracín, Blair T. Johnson & Mark P. Zanna eds., 2005).
One of the primary effects of a schema is its role in obscuring other possible schema.
Higdon, supra note 60, at 1235.
68. Other common myths about the law include quest, slayer, journey, trickster, and
betrayal. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. It is helpful to begin with birth and
rescue because these myths commonly use different plot structures and, therefore, are
available in different legal situations. Birth stories begin in narrative motion and seek change
in the law, while rescue stories often begin with a steady state and seek reaffirmation of
current law. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 112–14 (examining plot
structures and the requirements for unfolding of the plot).
69. Brief for Petitioner, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 65-759), 1966
WL 100543.
70. Id. at *3–4.
71. Id. at *4.
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that point, a lawyer was appointed to represent Miranda, but Miranda’s fate
was already sealed.73 The author of the Petitioner’s Brief, John Paul Frank,
tells Miranda’s story—this closed room story74—in compelling terms. But
Frank tells another story too—a story about the governing law. 75 It is the
story of the growth and development of the right to counsel.76
Appreciating Frank’s story calls for a comparison of its structure with
an alternate structure common in legal analysis. In that alternate structure, a
writer would begin with the current governing law supported by a
discussion of the most recent authorities. If the current law is favorable, the
writer would add a policy discussion to support it. If not, the writer would
argue for change using other authorities and policy discussions. There
would be no plot and no action. The discussion would forego most of
narrative’s influence on perception. The problem is particularly troubling if
the writer wants to change current law because in narrative terms, the
argument has presented the current law as the steady state, the “legitimate
ordinary.”77 Having done so, the writer must now unseat her own implicit
narrative admission that the current law is legitimate.78
Frank’s story, though, begins not by explaining the current status of the
right to counsel, but with this sentence: “We deal here with growing law,
and look to where we are going by considering where we have been.”79
Notice the narrative move in that first sentence. It takes us80 from the
72. Id. at *9.
73. Id. at *5.
74. See supra text accompanying note 18.
75. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *10–35. See generally Sherwin, supra
note 9, at 711 (noting that Frank’s brief “activate[s] the brief reader’s implicit values of
fairness and equality” while also providing the necessary tools for judgment). While the
brief presented the issue as the right to counsel, the resulting opinion rested its result, in
significant part, on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384
U.S. at 439. As the brief states, however, “[t]hese are all different manifestations of the view
expressed by Justice Douglas . . . ‘that any accused—whether rich or poor—has the right to
consult a lawyer before talking with the police.’” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *34–
35.
76. See supra note 75.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 35–41. A brief may attempt to avoid this
problem, perhaps by presenting current law as the antagonist, the force against which the
protagonist must struggle. See Chestek, supra note 41, at 143–44 (proposing that “if the brief
writer can successfully, but subtly, identify [his or] her client as the protagonist, and the
opposing party or parties as antagonists, [he or] she will have created a reason for the court
to want to rule in [his or] her client’s favor.”). Strategically, however, it would be better, if
possible, to find a more positive way to portray current law.
78. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113–14 (examining plot
structures and the requirements for unfolding of the plot).
79. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *11.
80. Studying the brief’s legal story is best done by letting the story do its work on us—
the brief’s students—much as it would have worked on its original intended readers. Thus,
this article uses the intimacy of the first-person (we, us, our) to cast the brief’s students as its
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distant past straight to an imagined future. What is missing is the
troublesome state of the current law, which did not preclude admission of
Miranda’s confession.81 Rather than setting up current law as the legitimate
steady state, the story treats current law by omission and therefore, by
implication, as merely one of many interim stages in the ongoing growth of
constitutional doctrine and thus, not worthy of any particular importance.
From the argument’s first sentence, we are in narrative motion.
After this panoramic introductory view, the brief begins the story of
creating constitutional protections against pressured confessions. Starting
with the Fifteenth Century, we watch the doctrine grow, case by case by
case.82 The narrative pace is steady. One after another come the cases the
Court has decided: Johnson v. Zerbst, McNabb v. United States, Upshaw v.
United States, Mallory v. United States, Powell v. Alabama, Brown v.
Mississippi, and Chambers v. Florida.83 Metaphorically, we can almost see
the Court fashioning each new facet of the doctrine. The story brings us
then to Haley v. Ohio,84 and here the pace slows. The discussion spends
some time with the Haley opinion, naming the four subscribing Justices,
and then pauses so the narrator can underline the dramatic significance of
the case:
We assume that the opinion in Haley, had it been of five Justices, would
totally control in the instant situation. . . . But there were not five. Justice
Frankfurter concurred specially . . . . He concluded that the confession
intended readers. In the kind of rhetorical analysis undertaken here, the distance of thirdperson academic language would blunt the understanding of the brief’s impact. To do a
rhetorical analysis is to tell the story of a story. In that meta-story, we, the readers, are key
characters. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 9, 12 (1994) (hypothesizing that appellate briefs become stories when they
“create[] a world of characters and actions and experiences.”).
81. See infra text accompanying note 99.
82. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *11–33.
83. Id. at *11–21 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (finding that the Sixth
Amendment protects a federal criminal defendant from deprivation of life and liberty unless
he has waived his right to counsel); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (finding
confession obtained through extended detention inadmissible); Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410 (1948) (finding a confession inadmissible where it was obtained during an illegal
detention); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (finding that a delay in booking an
accused must not last long enough that it is likely to compel a confession); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (finding that an individual’s right to counsel requires the court
to provide counsel to an accused whether or not he requests it); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (finding a confession inadmissible where the accused had been subjected to
violence); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (finding a confession obtained through
extended questioning inadmissible where the accused had been isolated from friends and
family and was without counsel)).
84. Id. at *21 (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (recognizing the trial court’s
authority to rule on disputed evidence after assessing the credibility of the evidence supplied
by each side)).
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should be barred because of specialized circumstances in the particular
case, without reaching the broader question.85

Perhaps we feel a little disappointment. The birth labor has slowed. The
Court was on the verge of completing a long, hard process, but at the last
moment, one of the Justices hesitated.86 Notice the first appearance here of
another narrative principle—the narrative gap. As Peter Brooks put it, a gap
“demands to be filled; it activates the interpreter’s ingenuity.”87 When a
reader sees a gap in a story, the reader wants to fill in that gap.88 That, of
course, is exactly what John Frank wants the present Court to do.
After identifying the gap, the story resumes:
In 1957, two new voices were added in this Court on the right to
counsel at the interrogation state [sic]. The case was In re Groban’s
Petition . . . . The majority opinion, by Justice Reed on his last day on
the Court, found distinctions because this was an administrative hearing
and therefore did not reach the principal question. Justice[s] Black,
[Warren, Douglas, and Brennan] did.89

Disappointment again; another opportunity to fill the gap, missed once
again by so close a margin. The pace now quickens: “These same
dissenting Justices expressed their views again in Crooker v. California . . .
and [then again in] Cicenia v. La Gay . . . . Justice[s] Douglas, [Warren,
Black, and Brennan] gave an emphatic and detailed analysis of the absolute
need for counsel at the pretrial stage . . . .”90 Beginning with the discussion
of Haley v. Ohio, the argument named the Justices who are working to
complete the doctrine. 91 Naming the Justices helps us identify the
characters, understand their goals, and share some of their frustration.92
This naming continues as the pace picks up speed again, now with added
strength and urgency:
Soon after Crooker and Cicenia, the tide which was to overrule Betts 93
began to flow with new vigor. . . . Justices Douglas and Brennan called
outright for the overruling of Betts. . . . Justices Frankfurter and Stewart
. . . held that a confession should not be admitted. . . . Justices Douglas
85. Id. (citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. at 605).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear, supra note 18, at 117 (citations omitted).
88. See LARUE, supra note 3, at 137.
89. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 69, at *21–22 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at *23–24 (citations omitted).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 58–61 & 84–86.
92. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
93. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *25 (referencing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455, 471 (1942) (holding in part that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to state criminal
proceedings)).
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and Black wished to rest frankly on the principle [of the right to consult
a lawyer before interrogation]. [T]hese Justices felt that all defendants
are entitled to know their constitutional rights.94

In this description, we hear the voices of these four Justices urging their
positions, each speaker breaking in when the prior speaker stops to take a
breath.95 There is narrative energy here. It is a noisy scene with animated
voices making their points. The quickened pace then pauses. The individual
voices are quiet long enough for the narrator to summarize: “At the end of
the Betts period, the condition of the constitutional law on the right to
counsel . . . was this. . . .”96 The argument then lists the components now in
place and those still missing.97
After this interim summary, the story continues as Gideon takes the
crucial developmental step of overruling Betts:
In overruling Betts, Justice Black . . . closed the [procedural] circle by
applying the principle of his own 1938 opinion of Johnson v. Zerbst [sic]
to state proceedings. . . .
It follows that so far as the Sixth Amendment is concerned, after
March 18, 1963,98 there is no difference between the right to counsel . . .
in the two court systems.99

Then, and only then, after the story of this long process, do we learn the
current state of the law. Our narrator tells us, in tabulated form, that as of
the spring of 1963:
1. Defendants were entitled to counsel at all trials in the federal
courts . . . .100
2. Defendants in state courts were entitled to counsel in all trials.101
3. Persons were entitled to counsel in all federal arraignments . . . and in
all arraignments or analogous proceedings under state law at which
anything of consequence can happen.102

94. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *25–26 (citations omitted).
95. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
96. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *26.
97. Id. (citations omitted).
98. One hint that this is a conscious narrative is the narrator’s care in using dates to
keep us focused on our progress through the story (the rising action) and our relative
distance to the story’s climax. In a typical recitation of precedent, the writer customarily
does not draw particular attention to the dates of interim precedent.
99. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *27 (citation omitted) (referencing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
100. Id. at *28 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
101. Id. (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
102. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963)).
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4. Several Justices believed that in all cases, a person who requested
counsel at pre-arraignment investigation was entitled to it . . . .103
5. Several Justices believed that, requested or not, a person has a right to
counsel upon interrogation unless he intelligently waived that right.104

Situation 5 is that presented in the instant case.105
Here is the drum-roll. The legal discussion goes on to offer policy
reasons106 for why the Court should resolve “Situation 5,” but the story of
the slow, careful development of the law has prepared us to hear those
policy arguments. The story began five hundred years ago.107 We heard
how, bit by bit, the right to counsel grew. The story has brought us now to
the pleroma—the fullness—of time, when the crucial decision will be
made. The long story of the law has met Ernesto Miranda’s case.108
In this story, every part of the doctrine has been added except one. But
that last part—Miranda’s part—need not be created from whole cloth
because to listen to a creation story is to have already imagined the fully
developed doctrine the characters are creating.109 The doctrine actually
exists. It remains only to bring it out of our minds and onto the pages of an
opinion. Here is how the brief states it several pages later: “The right does
exist. It is the same. This is not the result of a single case, Escobedo or any
other. Rather there is a tide in the affairs of men,110 and it is this engulfing
tide which is washing away the secret interrogation of the unprotected
accused.”111 The bold assertion that began the Summary of the Argument
pages earlier now makes sense: “There is a right to counsel for arrested
persons when interrogated by the police. The law has been growing in this

103. Id. (citing Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. La Gay, 357
U.S. 504 (1958)).
104. Id. (citing In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957); Crooker, 357 U.S. 4333; Cicenia,
357 U.S. 504).
105. Id.
106. Id. at *35–48. The brief argues that (1) the additional cost of administering the
criminal justice system is justified by the importance of the defendants’ rights; and (2) law
enforcement will not be hamstrung by the participation of defense counsel during
interrogation. Id.
107. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
108. “Situation 5 is that presented in the instant case.” Brief for Petitioner, supra note
69, at *28.
109. See generally Higdon, supra note 60 (discussing the cognitive science behind this
kind of narrative foreshadowing).
110. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *34 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS
CAESAR, act 4, sc. 3) (“There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men, Which taken at the Flood, leads
on to Fortune.”).
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *34. The argument’s first point heading
boldly states, “There Is a Right to Counsel for Arrested Persons When Interrogated by the
Police.” Id. at *11.
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direction for more than thirty years.”112At first those two sentences seemed
inconsistent; surely to say that the law has been growing in this direction is
to implicitly admit that no authority has yet declared the principle.113 Yet it
is exactly that growth that has created the right, positioning it as the telos—
the consummation, the destiny to which the “affairs of men” inevitably
lead.114 All that remains is to recognize it formally.115
Compare the movement of that plot to a more formalistic structure of
legal analysis. Without the story, the writer likely would begin by baldly
articulating the current law with no action happening anywhere in the
discussion.116 The argument would set out the troublesome current law as
the implicitly legitimate “steady state” and move us nowhere from there.117
We would have to seek a legal change with only abstract policy arguments
instead of with a story that encodes the argument’s message: that the
process must be completed—as any birth process must be completed—with
the right to counsel fully and finally recognized.118
Frank’s argument is a creation or birth story, a primary archetype.119 In
fact, at the end of the argument section, the brief becomes explicit. Frank
112. Id. at *6.
113. See supra note 77 & 78 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 110.
115. See id.
116. I do not mean to imply that the current law does not have stories of its own and
that those stories are not encoded within the existing legal rule or standard. I refer here only
to whether those stories are made somehow more explicit in a creation story than in a mere
recitation of the rule. See supra p. 11 and note 77.
117. See supra pp. 11–12 and notes 77–82.
118. See supra notes 34 & 51–57 and accompanying text.
119. A case can be made for a journey narrative as well. Creation and journey
narratives share a common metaphorical structure. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying
text. They both begin in the (often distant) past and set out a long story of movement or
development. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. A classic legal journey
narrative, though, is broader in scope, describing the journey of a people or a culture toward
its higher destiny. For instance, in the Petitioner’s brief in Aikens v. California, (the
functional brief for the consolidated cases commonly known as Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972)), we read the story of the movement of humanity in general and the United
States in particular toward a more civilized understanding of punishment. See Brief for
Petitioner at 7, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972) (No. 68-5027). There, the nation is
the character that is moving toward a destination. See id. The story Frank tells in Miranda’s
brief, on the other hand, is the story of legal doctrines and their growth. See supra notes 75–
76 and accompanying text. We might think of creation and journey as two distinct myths,
but it would be a mistake to place too much importance on the distinctions between them.
Implied myths such as these do not and need not operate with scientific precision. See
WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 130. The critical point is the
metaphorical structure, which is the same in these two myths. See supra notes 26–33 and
accompanying text. Each tells the story of a long process of setting the world right
somehow. These metaphorical structures are “sufficiently generalized to allow for many
instantiations.” See WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 130.
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quotes Justice Douglas when he referred to the right to counsel as “yet
unborn”120 and later refers to the “birth”121 of the right to counsel at the
interrogation stage. A birth narrative like this one is inherently powerful. It
rings true to us on a deep and unconscious level because it is a primary
archetype, a familiar plot we know by heart.122
Who are the characters in this story? The protagonists include the many
nameless lawyers and judges123 involved in all the cases throughout the
years, and especially the Justices who sat in the minority for so long,
coming so close to a majority time and again.124 In fact, in an important
sense, this is a story about the Court itself.125 The brief is telling the Court a
story about who it is and about the important work it has been doing. In
fact, it may be that almost all stories written in briefs to the Court are,
ultimately, stories about the Court itself.
Will the work be completed? As we hear the story of the struggle, we
find ourselves rooting for the protagonists, in part because of the struggle
itself. For when we watch someone attempt something difficult, we almost
automatically want them to succeed. The climax is not resolved in the brief,
of course. If it were, the tension the brief worked so hard to build would
dissipate, leaving the Court with little narrative impetus to act. Instead, the
brief brings the tension of the story to its climactic height, and presents that
tension to the Court. The height of the tension urges the Court to complete
the story, to bring about the destiny toward which the story has been
moving. And of course, that is just what the Court in Miranda did.126
BOWERS V. HARDWICK AS A RESCUE STORY
Unlike the birth story in Miranda, a rescue story is often less obviously
narratival. In a birth story, the facts usually are presented as a chronology.
127
Key events are set out as challenges that are faced and overcome.128 First
this, then that, then something else, moving us on to an anticipated
culmination. If we simply stop to notice, we can tell that we are reading a
120. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69, at *30 (citations omitted).
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Since this is a story about the creation
of a legal doctrine, the primary protagonists can be legal actors rather than the individual
clients who happened to find themselves in need of the doctrine at one point or another. See
supra text accompanying note 56. When the clients primarily served by the doctrine are, by
definition, problematic in a narrative sense (e.g., convicted felons) this casting alternative
can be most helpful.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 84–86, 89–90, 93–94, 99 & 101–104.
125. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 499 (1965).
127. The same is true for a journey story, which also relates events in chronological
fashion, moving toward a preordained future.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 83 & 100–104.
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story. A rescue story, however, may be harder to recognize because it may
not be signaled by a chronology. To create a narrative situation, a rescue
story may depend not so much on reciting a series of historical events, as on
presenting particular kinds of characters set in particular kinds of narrative
situations. The plotline does not appear on the page, but the reader will
supply it, unconsciously choosing from the ready supply of master stories in
the shared culture.129
Rescue stories can be told overtly or by implication. Either way, the
story happens in the midst of danger presented by evil forces bent on
domination or destruction. A band of the faithful—usually outnumbered
and outgunned—resists. The object of rescue might be a person; someone
we care about is in danger, vulnerable to harm, or already captured. The
protagonists’ task is to save the vulnerable character. A classic example
from world literature is the ancient Sanskrit epic story of Ram’s rescue of
his wife, Sita, who had been captured by the evil Ravana, King of the
Demons.130 Another ancient example is the story of Perseus, who rescued
Andromeda, his future wife.131 Andromeda had been chained to a rock as a
sacrifice to a sea monster.132
The object of rescue might also be an item of great value, such as a
talisman or an amulet worn for protection or power. The antagonist is trying
to take or destroy the talisman, and the protagonists must retrieve or
safeguard it, either to preserve its protective power or to prevent its
misuse.133 Examples of talisman stories abound in literature and film. Most
obvious are fantasies such as The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien’s trilogy in
which Frodo Baggins and his faithful friends must keep the One Ring from
the hands of the Dark Lord Sauron, who intends to use it as the ultimate
weapon to rule and brutally oppress Middle-Earth.134 Battles over the
possession of a talisman or some other all-important item exist outside of
fantasy as well, for instance, in stories about the possession of a nuclear
warhead135 or an important scientific formula.136
129. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
130. VĀLMIKI, THE RAMAYANA (Arshia Sattar trans., Penguin Books 2003).
131. Ovid, Metamorphoses, in CLASSICAL GODS AND HEROES: MYTHS AS TOLD BY THE
ANCIENT AUTHORS 97–99 (Rhoda A. Hendricks trans., 1972).
132. Id. A modern example is the story of John McClane’s rescue of his captured wife,
Holly, and her co-workers in the film DIE HARD (Twentieth Century Fox 1988). A darker
and less transparent example is David Lynch and Mark Frost’s story of Special Agent Dale
Cooper’s entry into the Black Lodge to rescue Annie Blackburn. Twin Peaks: Beyond Life
and Death (ABC television broadcast June 10, 1991). Teacher stories often operate as stories
of rescue. See, e.g., DANGEROUS MINDS (Hollywood Pictures 1995); THE MIRACLE WORKER
(United Artists 1962); TO SIR, WITH LOVE (Columbia Pictures 1967).
133. Not every story about a talisman is a rescue story with an antagonist vying for
control of the talisman. One of the greatest stories about a talisman is the story of the search
for the Holy Grail, a story of quest rather than rescue.
134. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS (Geo. Allen & Unwin 1954–1955).
135. FOR YOUR EYES ONLY (United Artists 1981) (James Bond retrieves a stolen British
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Whether the goal is to safeguard a talisman or to save a character in
danger, the nature of the task is the same: rescuing someone or something
important. That is the task faced by Laurence Tribe, Kathleen Sullivan,
Brian Koukoutchos, and Kathleen Wilde in Michael Hardwick’s brief to the
United States Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick.137 Hardwick centered
upon the right to privacy in intimate relationships.138 Surprisingly, the brief
portrays the right as already established. Because the Eleventh Circuit had
recognized the right in the Hardwick opinion below,139 Tribe, Sullivan,
Koukoutchos, and Wilde could position the right as the narrative’s “steady
state.”140 Immediately, though, we141 learn that the right is in danger:
The State of Georgia urges this Court to overturn that ruling and declare
that a law reaching into the bedroom to regulate intimate sexual conduct is
to be tested by no stricter a standard than a law that regulates the
community environment outside the home: namely, a standard of minimal
scrutiny. In the State’s view, the most private intimacies may thus be
treated as public displays, and the sanctum of home and bedroom merged
into the stream of commerce—all subject to regulation whenever there is
any conceivable “rational relationship” to the promotion of “traditional”
or “prevailing” notions of “morality and decency.”142

And again, in the first line of the Argument section:
[T]he State of Georgia has criminalized certain sexual activities defined
solely by the parts of the body they involve, no matter who engages in
them, with whom, or where. Georgia threatens to punish these activities
with imprisonment even if engaged in by two willing adults—whether
married or unmarried, heterosexual or homosexual—who have secluded
themselves behind closed bedroom doors in their own home, as Michael
Hardwick did. All that is at issue in this case is whether a state must have

missile command system sought by the KGB); THUNDERBALL (United Artists 1965) (James
Bond retrieves two stolen thermonuclear weapons intended to be used to start World War
III).
136. THE SAINT (Paramount Pictures 1997) (the formula for cold fusion).
137. Brief for Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140),
1986 WL 720442.
138. More precisely stated, the issue was whether the state must prove a compelling
interest in order to restrict the right to privacy in intimate relationships within the home. Id.
at *5–6.
139. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 1985).
140. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
141. As in the discussion of Miranda’s brief, this article uses the intimacy of the firstperson to cast us, the brief’s students, as the brief’s intended readers. See supra note 80.
142. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *5–6.
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a substantial justification when it reaches that far into so private a
realm.143

First, notice the powerful metaphor of the State “reaching . . . into a
private realm.” In one sentence, the metaphor takes the visceral reaction
that some readers in 1986 likely would have had to the act of sodomy144 and
turns that reaction back on the challenged statute. It casts the State of
Georgia as the sodomizer of its own citizens. The act is more than
metaphorical sodomy, because unlike the lovers in the case, the State’s act
is violent and nonconsensual.145 The image recurs throughout the entire
legal discussion in phrases like “a law that so thoroughly invades
individuals’ most intimate affairs;”146 or a law that “intrudes the grasp of
the criminal law deep into” such an area;147 or the requirement that the
government must give “substantial justification to the individual whose
personal dwelling it would enter;”148 or the “State of Georgia contends that
it may extend its criminal authority deep inside the private home.”149
In the midst of the violent world these images create, the characters
play out the story. The procedural statement sets the battle scene. We learn
that the Eleventh Circuit opinion established a right to privacy, but the State
of Georgia has appealed, arguing that no such right should exist for the
intimate/sexual activities at issue here.150 Hardwick and his lawyers are the
protagonists, struggling to protect the right to privacy.151 The antagonist is
“the State of Georgia,” a character with a flawed reputation before the
Court.152 The brief capitalizes on this flawed reputation by personalizing
Georgia. Repeatedly, we hear that the “State of Georgia” has done or is
doing something. In fact, the other characters hardly act at all; Georgia is
the primary actor in the drama: “The State of Georgia [sent] its police into
private bedrooms . . . . ”153 “Georgia threatens to punish . . . .”154 “Georgia
143. Id. at *5.
144. Ideally, a lawyer might hope to convince readers that, in and of itself, sodomy is
not a violent, immoral act, but as a matter of strategy in 1986, that hope might not have been
feasible.
145. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *1 (noting that the parties arrested under
the Georgia statute were two adults engaging in consensual sexual acts).
146. Id. at *4.
147. Id. at *19.
148. Id. at *9.
149. Id. at *14.
150. Id. at *5–6.
151. See generally WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3 (“The protagonist
slot is filled out by the central idea or theory of the argument. The antagonist is the mistaken
idea, author, or theory under challenge.”).
152. The Court had already struck Georgia’s attempt to criminalize the purely private
possession of obscene materials within the home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559
(1969).
153. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *1.

902

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:883

would read”155 “Georgia argues . . . .”156 “Georgia alludes . . . .”157 “Georgia
has never explained . . . .”158 Instead of referring to what “the statute” does
or says, the brief seldom misses a chance to personalize Georgia as the bad
actor in this drama.
The story has protagonists and an antagonist, but the story needs
someone or something to rescue or protect.159 One analysis would cast the
right to privacy as the talisman still precariously held by the protagonists
but in great danger of destruction by the State of Georgia.160 This talisman
alone provides protection against Georgia’s violation of its citizens, who
will otherwise be defenseless against the power of the State. Georgia has
mounted a forceful campaign to destroy the right or to neutralize its
protective power.161 The battle’s purpose is to keep the talisman and its
protection in the hands of those who need it.
The concept of the talisman is an easy fit here and works more than
adequately to explicate the narrative in the legal argument, but another
possible analysis adds interesting narrative dimensions. The right to
privacy162 might be seen as a character itself; it may function, in fact, as the
archetypal Divine or Magic Child.163 The Magic Child is young, small, and
vulnerable, even powerless.164 The Child often comes from an unlikely
source, such as from a low socioeconomic background or from some kind
of scandal. In the archetypal story, evil forces are out to kill the Divine
Child, but if the Child can be saved, the Child proves to have the power to
save or transform us all. There is often an element of surprise in the Child’s
power to save. The protagonists may initially be acting for important but
less grand reasons, such as the mere protection of the Child. Only as the
story progresses do we learn that what is at stake is much bigger than the
safety of one small character.

154. Id. at *5.
155. Id. at *10.
156. Id. at *7.
157. Id. at *27.
158. Id. at *13.
159. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 112–14 (examining plot
structures and the requirements for unfolding of the plot).
160. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *5–6.
161. See id. at *5–8.
162. See supra text accompanying note 53.
163. See generally JUNG, supra note 58 (an important Jungian archetype in Jungian
psychology).
164. The Divine Child is an exception to the general principle that a character must be
able to will, to feel, and to act. The whole narrative function of the Divine Child, prior to the
climax and resolution, flows from the Child’s inability to act. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER
supra note 3, at 113; WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 109; see also supra
text accompanying note 22.
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Culturally, we see the Divine Child in myths such as those surrounding
the births of Jesus165 and Moses.166 Both Jesus and Moses were vulnerable
infants from unlikely origins, including low social status and even scandal.
Strong forces were out to hurt both, but both were saved and protected by a
small, brave group. Both proved to have the power to save or transform the
larger group.167
At the time of Moses’ birth, the Israelites were slaves in Egypt.168
Fearing eventual revolt, the Pharaoh ordered the killing of all newborn
Israelite boys.169 Moses’ mother and sister placed him in a basket and set
him loose on the river.170 He was found by an Egyptian princess, who raised
him as her own.171 As an adult, Moses led the Hebrews out of slavery and to
the safety of their own land.172 Remarkably similar myths surround the
births of other mythic figures such as Gilgamesh,173 Romulus and Remus,174

165. See Matthew 1:18–2:11.
166. See Exodus 2:1–10.
167. See generally Exodus 1:1–40:38; Matthew 1:1–15:39.
168. Exodus 1:8–14.
169. Id. at 1:22.
170. Id. at 2:3.
171. Id. at 2:5–10.
172. Id. at 14:13–31.
173. In one of the earliest known works of literature, an oracle declares to the King of
Babylon that his grandson, Gilgamesh, will kill him. The King throws Gilgamesh out of a
tower, but an eagle breaks his fall. A gardener finds the infant and raises him. Gilgamesh is
portrayed as part human and part divine. In adulthood, he built the legendary walls of Uruk,
protecting his people from attack. See generally THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH (Maureen Gallery
Kovacs trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1989).
174. Romulus and Remus were twin sons born of the seduction of a vestal virgin by
Mars, the god of war. Their uncle, King Amulius, ordered them killed, but a servant placed
them in a basket and laid them beside the Tiber River, which carried them away. The infants
were later found and cared for by a shepherd, who raised them as his own. In adulthood,
Romulus became the King of Rome and was deified as the divine persona of the Roman
people. PIERRE GRIMAL, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY 389–391
(Stephen Kershaw ed., A.R. Maxwell-Hyslop trans., Penguin Books 1991).
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Perseus,175 Paris,176 and King Sargon of Agade (ancient Mesopotamian
city).177
Jesus was born of Mary, an unmarried woman engaged to the carpenter
Joseph.178 Rather than break the engagement and risk the lives of mother
and child, Joseph proceeded with the marriage.179 Just after Jesus was born,
sages told King Herod that a future king had been born in Bethlehem.180
Fearing eventual overthrow, Herod ordered the killing of all infant males in
Bethlehem.181 Joseph was warned in a dream, however, and the couple fled
to Egypt with the child.182 Some years later, after Herod’s death, the family
returned.183 Jesus grew to be a great teacher and healer and is regarded by
Christians as the human incarnation of God.184
Modern versions of archetypal stories often include a Magic Child
component as well. For instance, at the cost of her own life, Harry Potter’s
mother saves the infant Harry from Voldemort.185 Then other brave
caretakers protect him during his childhood.186 As he grows, Harry develops
175. Perseus was the son of Zeus and the only daughter of the King of Argos. A
prophesy warned that the King would be killed by his grandson, so the King placed mother
and child into a wooden chest and cast them into the sea. They washed up on shore and were
taken in by fishermen, who raised the boy. In adulthood, Perseus founded Mycenae and was
the first of the mythic heroes of Greek mythology. RICHARD P. MARTIN, MYTHS OF THE
ANCIENT GREEKS 185–199 (New American Library 2003).
176. Paris was the son of Priam, the King of Troy. A seer foretold that the child would
be responsible for the downfall of Troy. The King ordered that Paris be left exposed on
Mound Ida, but he was saved and raised by herdsmen. As a young man, he was rediscovered
at a festival in his own honor, a festival honoring the “hero-baby” who had saved Troy by
his supposed death. Id. at 266–69 (New American Library 2003).
177. One text relates that Sargon was the illegitimate son of a priestess and an unknown
father. After his birth, his mother placed him in a basket of rushes and put him in the river.
The river took him to Akki, a drawer of water, who raised Sargon as his own. In adulthood,
Sargon became the emperor of Mesopotamia. 2 LEONARD WILLIAM KING, CHRONICLES
CONCERNING EARLY BABYLONIAN KINGS 87–96 (1907).
178. Matthew 1:18–25.
179. Id. at 1:18.
180. Id. at 2:3–5.
181. Id. at 2:16.
182. Id. at 2:13–14.
183. Id. at 2:14–15.
184. See generally id. at 4:12–15:39.
185. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCEROR’S STONE 294 (Arthur A. Levine
Books 1997).
186. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (Arthur A. Levine
Books 1997); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS (Arthur A.
Levine Books 1998); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Arthur
A. Levine Books 1999); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Arthur A.
Levine Books 2000); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX
(Arthur A. Levine Books 2003); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD
PRINCE (Arthur A. Levine Books 2005); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY
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unusual powers, which he ultimately uses to save the wizard world from
Voldemort’s brutal domination.187 Another modern example is the story of
the American cultural icon “Superman,” a story notably like the ancient
stories of Moses, Romulus and Remus, Gilgamesh, Perseus, Paris, and
Sargon. Superman was born on Krypton.188 As an infant named Kal-El, he
was saved from his planet’s destruction when his father put him in a rocket
and sent him to Earth.189 There he was found and adopted by a simple,
farming couple, who raised him with a new name, Clark Kent.190 It soon
became apparent that he possessed superhuman powers, which he
subsequently used to protect others in danger.191
So is there a Divine Child in Michael Hardwick’s brief? If Lakoff and
Johnson are right that people reify ideas,192 then a constitutional principle, a
line of cases, or even one important case holding might be cast as the
character of the Divine Child. Like the archetypal Divine Child, a
constitutional doctrine is not able to protect itself. It is constantly vulnerable
to erosion or even destruction. But if citizens and the Court protect the
doctrine, it will ultimately protect and save us all.193 The Hardwick brief
can be seen to cast the right to privacy as the Divine Child. The argument
quotes Justice Harlan’s reference to liberty under the Due Process Clause as
“a living thing.”194 It establishes the right’s supreme importance by quoting
Justice Brandeis: “This case is thus about the very core of that ‘most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,’
namely, ‘as against the Government, the right to be let alone.’”195
Like the archetypal Child, the right is very young, having been born
only a few months earlier in the decision below.196 It is especially
vulnerable precisely because of its recent birth. It is not a long-standing
doctrine, which would be harder to overturn. Rather, the Court could simply
reverse the holding below.197 It would not even need to overturn a holding
from an earlier case.
HALLOWS (Arthur A. Levine Books 2007).
187. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE DEATHLY HALLOWS, supra note 186, at
743–44.
188. SUPERMAN (Warner Bros. 1978).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See generally LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 52.
193. In fact, we may so closely identify the doctrine with our own need for privacy in
the realm of sexual intimacy that we may think of ourselves as the Child being rescued.
194. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 137, at *8 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
195. Id. at *7 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
196. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *5–6 (referencing Bowers v. Hardwick,
760 F.2d 1202 (1985)).
197. Id.
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Also, like the archetypal Child, the right was associated in the 1980s
with a situation of low social status tainted with scandal. It was invoked to
protect the world of alternative sexualities, a world driven underground by
the law and, therefore, relegated to metaphorically dark places and peopled
by the scorned and the outcast.198 But again, like the myth of the Magic
Child, the right to privacy has the power to transcend particular situations
and to extend its protection to all who need it.199 Throughout the argument
are nearly constant, implied images that any of us could be next and that
Georgia’s police could soon be invading our own bedrooms.200 The
argument frames the issue in terms of what Georgia can do to its citizens
rather than what it has done to Michael Hardwick.201 The brief speaks of
bedrooms, reminding us that the statute applies to any “two willing adults—
whether married or unmarried, heterosexual or homosexual—who have
secluded themselves behind closed bedroom doors in their own home.”202
In addition, the brief makes ample use of plural first-person pronouns:
“such casual state control of our most private realm;”203 “our government
cannot lightly trespass in the intimacies of our sexual lives—whether or not
our conduct of those intimacies at any given moment involves a choice
about conceiving a child;”204 “When we retreat inside that line [(the door of
our homes)];”205 “The home not only protects us from government
surveillance, but also ‘provide[s] the setting for [our] . . . intimate
activities;’”206 and “The home surely protects more than our fantasies
alone.”207 Thus, protecting the right to privacy here will protect each
individual from violation by the State.208
198. Early black and white scenes in the movie MILK paint a dismally instructive
picture of the consequences of the law’s treatment of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered (“LGBT”) communities during the time frame leading up to the Hardwick
brief. MILK (Universal Pictures 2008).
199. Just as Jesus and Moses each transcended their particular vulnerabilities and
extended their protection to others. See supra text accompanying notes 165–167. See
generally Exodus 1:1–40:38; Matthew 1:1–15:39.
200. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *10–11 (“There can thus be
no doubt that our fundamental liberty entitles us to demand strong reason when government
would bar us from procreating.”).
201. See generally id., at *19 (“[A] Georgia citizen must be entitled to demand not only
a warrant of the Georgia police officer who enters his bedroom, but also a justification of the
Georgia legislature when it declares criminal the consensual intimacies he chooses to engage
in there.”)
202. Id. at *5. “The home surely protects more than our fantasies alone.” Id. at *16.
203. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at *12 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at *15 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at *15–16 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)
(emphasis added)).
207. Id. at *16 (emphasis added).
208. The archetype encapsulates the necessary narrative concept of identification. As
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Regardless of whether this rescue story is a struggle over protection of
a talisman or a Divine Child, the battle is intense. The right to privacy is
under attack by the Evil Antagonist (the State of Georgia) and the doctrine
is utterly unable to protect itself. A small band is working to protect it, but
ultimately, the only savior is the story’s Champion, the United States
Supreme Court, who is asked to come to the rescue. The archetype
promises that if this Champion will protect the right to privacy, the right
will survive to later protect us all.209
This masterful brief very nearly won this difficult case. The decision
was five-to-four, and Justice Powell had vacillated throughout the
deliberations.210 Asked about the Bowers v. Harwick decision four years
later, Justice Powell said, “I think I probably made a mistake in that one.”211
He explained, “When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few
months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments.”212 Had
Justice Powell gone the other way, the right to privacy in intimate
relationships would have been established in 1986, long before Lawrence v.
Texas.213
TELLING STORIES ABOUT LAW
Unearthing the stories beneath the legal arguments in the Miranda and
Hardwick briefs expands our academic understanding of how law develops.
But our interest in legal narratives is greater than mere academic curiosity if
these alternative stories operate differently in legally significant ways. As it
Steven Winter explains, “We imagine ourselves as the protagonist and picture ourselves in
the protagonist’s shoes as we proceed from introduction to conclusion.” See Winter, The
Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2272. I would add that identification can function also
when we imagine the protagonist as someone we care about. See infra note 211.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 165–167.
210. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 521–24 (Scribner’s Sons
1994).
211. Id. at 530. Jeffries describes how Justice Powell had been unable to understand
gay men on a human level. Id. at 521. At least twice, he made the remarkable proclamation
that he had never known a homosexual. Id. He did not know that gay men had served as
clerks for him in the past, nor that a gay man was serving as his clerk at the time of the
deliberations in Bowers v. Hardwick. Id. Because Powell perceived that this clerk was more
liberal than the others, Powell had initiated several conversations with him, trying to
understand what it meant to be gay. Id. Jeffries reports that Powell was never able to come to
terms with homosexuality as “a logical expression of the desire and affection that gay men
felt for other men.” Id. In other words, in the case of Justice Powell, the necessary narrative
component of identification had failed.
212. Id. at 530.
213. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Prior to Lawrence v. Texas, the Georgia
Supreme Court struck down the Georgia sodomy statute as unconstitutional under the
Georgia Constitution. Ironically, that case was styled Powell v. Georgia, 510 S.E.2d 18
(1998).
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turns out, that is in fact the case. Birth stories and rescue stories each have
particular limitations, and each bring particular advantages to the task of
persuasion214 and thus, to the development of law. At the very least, these
stories differ in how they treat current law, in the outcomes they desire, in
the degree of their implied legitimacy, in the degree to which they require
the court to identify with a party, and in the degree to which they can create
dramatic tension.
A foundational difference is that a rescue story calls for reaffirming
existing law, or at least existing policy.215 In a rescue story, the antagonist is
the character seeking change, while the protagonists seek protection for
something that already exists, albeit in a vulnerable situation.216 The story
uses a steady state/trouble/resolution plot structure, so it can position itself
as conservative, a particularly helpful rhetorical posture.217 Such a story
asks only for a return to normal, legitimate, ordinary life—a request that
seems little enough to ask.218
A birth story, on the other hand, calls for a change in the law, but the
change is presented as the natural culmination of a normal process.219 A
birth story, then, offers a way to make a call for change seem more
conservative.220 This is no revolution, says the analysis. This is merely the
214. The purpose of any written legal analysis in a litigation setting, including the
analysis in a judicial opinion, is to persuade. See generally K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960); Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 10, 10 (1997) (“Writing opinions is a lot like writing briefs. Both are, at bottom,
efforts to persuade. Lawyers want to satisfy clients and win [cases]. Judges want to persuade
lawyers, litigants, [and] the community at large that the decision they have made . . . is the
absolutely correct one.”); Steven L.Winter, Making the Familiar Conventional Again, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1607, 1635–36 (2001); Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An
Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 260 n.104 (1990).
215. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113; see also text accompanying
notes 35–41.
216. Because antagonists are trying to disrupt the steady state, the narrative structure
positions their cause as the threat to be overcome. See text accompanying note 40.
217. See supra text accompanying note 133. The Hardwick brief presented the ruling
from the lower court as the legal status quo. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137, at *3
(citing Hardwick, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985) (decided on May 21, 1985)). A rescue
story would work even better, however, where the existing law had a life span of longer than
several months and had been declared, or at least implicitly accepted by more than one court.
To the extent that a reader might not be willing to see the Eleventh Circuit holding as current
law, the argument might have been better served by the story of a quest, searching for the
protective talisman which is almost, but not quite, within reach.
218. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113.
219. See generally Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2277. (“For, if
the legal rule is not already grounded in social experience, the legal stories told by those who
would make law will seem arbitrary and illegitimate.”).
220. See generally id. (“Transformative argument is possible because the advocate can
use narrative to invite the audience into the world of the rights-holder (or rights-seeker).
That world will be constructed in part of models and metaphors already shared with the
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culmination of a natural and inevitable process in which the law has been
engaged for a long time. This normal, natural process is moving the law in a
trajectory toward a future that has been preordained from the start.221 In a
birth story, there is nothing unusual or alarming about that forward
movement. In fact, the end result is nothing more than our path toward
establishing an anticipated steady state, the preordained “legitimate
ordinary.”222 In a narrative sense, a birth story allows the narrator to
establish an imagined steady state even when it does not yet exist.223
A related point of comparison, then, is how the two stories are able to
treat current law. As Miranda’s brief demonstrates,224 a birth story
deemphasizes inconvenient current law. In fact, the story can make current
law almost disappear in the course of the narrative sweep from the distant
past to a preordained future. A typical rescue story, on the other hand,
bolsters current law, arguing that it is vital to society’s shared enterprise
and to the welfare of many. Those attacking current law are seeking to
eviscerate its protection, perhaps by disregarding the careful, developmental
work that created normative legal standards.225
The stories differ also in the source of the desired outcome and the
degree of implied legitimacy that outcome can claim. For a rescue story, the
litigants are in a battle, which places them initially in a rhetorically equal
setting. The simple fact that a battle is occurring gives no narrative hint of
how the battle should end.226 A leaning in favor of protection arises once a
reader begins to relate to the battle as a rescue story. But because that
leaning may not seem preordained,227 it needs an affirmative case showing
the worthiness of the person or doctrine to be protected.228 A birth story,
too, must be accompanied by an affirmative case, however, the legitimacy
of the desired outcome (the culmination of an ongoing birth process) is
embedded in the narrative of the birth story itself.229 And since this
audience.”).
221. As my good friend Jack Sammons points out, the kind of birth we speak of here
may be not so much the creation of a new life as the gradual uncovering of what has been
there all along.
222. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 113.
223. See id.
224. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69.
225. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3 (noting that the “legitimate
steady state” is disrupted by “Trouble”).
226. Contra Higdon, supra note 60; text accompanying note 109.
227. If the reader has begun to identify with the object or character needing rescue, see
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2272, then the leaning may already seem
preordained.
228. Of course every legal analysis should make such an affirmative case. The briefs in
both Miranda and Hardwick did an excellent job of making this corresponding affirmative
case. The question here is how much groundwork for that affirmative case can be laid by the
story itself.
229. See generally Sherwin, supra note 9, at 711 (noting that Frank’s brief provides the
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narrative assumption happens outside the reader’s notice, it is less subject to
the reader’s resistance.230
The stories also differ in the degree to which they must remain mired in
combat. A birth story need not rely primarily on casting opposing armies,
with one army intent on doing harm. It can rise above the fray of the
litigation, leaving behind much of the ugliness of conflict, and therefore,
reducing the focus on opposing arguments. It can work instead in the much
more abstract, rarified setting of law creation, transcending the current case
and inviting the reader to join in a larger, purer effort.231 A rescue story,
however, nearly always takes place in the context of a heated battle, and
taking a side means participating on a battlefield.
On a closely related point, the reader of a birth story may not have to
choose sides quite so blatantly since the story does not rely primarily on
casting opposing forces. A reader has already participated implicitly in the
creative effort by imagining the end result of the birth process.232 Therefore,
on some level, the reader has already been cast as a part of the protagonists’
creative effort.233 Rather than listening to a dispute from the narrative
perspective of a removed arbiter, the story casts the reader as having joined
the creative team long ago. This assumption, too, happens outside the
reader’s notice and, therefore, is less susceptible to resistance.234
The stories differ in the degree to which they can distance themselves
from litigants with whom a reader may have trouble identifying. A birth
story is about the completion of an historic process. A reader can be
invested in the process without identifying with a particular group of
litigants, so there is less pressure on the narrator to successfully characterize
a particular group as worthy of protection.235 Additionally, judges as
characters draw attention away from the litigants themselves. For instance,
in Miranda’s brief, one almost feels that the State of Arizona is litigating
against Justices Douglas, Brennan, Frankfurter, and Stewart, rather than
against Ernesto Miranda, a convicted felon with a long rap sheet.236 A
rescue story, however, depends more on the reader’s acceptance of the need
to protect someone. Characters must be cast as good guys and bad guys,
reader “with all that is needed for judgment”).
230. See supra note 66; see also Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at
2270 (noting that legal stories that are not grounded in social experience run the risk of
“failed communication”).
231. See supra notes 52 & 62 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
233. Steven Winter argues that this is true in all stories because the very process of
making meaning is one of identification and collaboration. WINTER, CLEARING IN THE
FOREST, supra note 3, chs. 5 & 8.
234. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2270.
235. Compare, with Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2272 (asserting
that readers identify with characters in a narrative).
236. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69.
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which may not always be easy and may be less feasible if the court has a
natural tendency to disidentify with the relevant group.237 It may be more
important, then, for a rescue story to broaden the group in need of
protection by the talisman or Magic Child, as the brief in Hardwick tried to
do.238
Finally, the two kinds of stories may differ in their relative ease of
creating the necessary dramatic tension. A creation story may need to do
extra work to convince the reader that the outcome of the process matters.
A reader’s investment in a creation story derives from watching a creative
process unfold, and the story will have to work to keep that process from
seeming bland.239 Ideally, a compelling birth or creation process would be
long and difficult, and its direction would be consistent, with no backward
steps.240 The relevant legal authorities, which provide the raw material for
the story, may or may not make such a depiction realistically possible. In a
battle or rescue story, by contrast, the reader’s investment derives from
watching a metaphorically violent struggle, where one side is vulnerable to
great harm. The impulse to protect someone we already know is stronger
than an impulse to create something new.241 The danger in a rescue story
makes it seem that there is more at stake. The difference between a weak
birth story and a well-told rescue story is like the difference between
watching an anonymous artist painting a landscape and watching Bruce
Willis sweating and bleeding in Die Hard.242 Many viewers would find Die
Hard more riveting as they wonder whether John McClane (Willis) and his
wife, Holly (Bonnie Bedelia), will live or die.
The choice of underlying myth, then, can play a significant role in
persuasion, and thus, in the development of the law.243 The operative
narrative and its accompanying metaphors create the lens through which we
view a legal issue and the context within which we imagine it operating.244
237. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 4, at 2272.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 201–208.
239. “Stories go somewhere. They have an end, a telos. If someone drifts in telling a
story, we urge him or her to “get to the point.” What gives stories this “point” is that, just as
they have a telos, they also have to do with some obstacle blocking progress toward it. If
there is no obstacle, no Trouble, there is no story—only a recital of some happening that
unfolded banally with nothing untoward to tell about.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note
3, at 127.
240. The Miranda brief was able to tell this kind of birth story. The argument carefully
laid out the development of the law with regard to the right to counsel in a manner akin to a
long and difficult “labor.” See supra text accompanying notes 82–108.
241. See generally Sherwin, supra note 9, at 714 (“[W]ho needs facts when the
uncertainties involved implicate such vulnerability and potential for . . . abuse?”).
242. DIE HARD, supra note 132.
243. See Sherwin, supra note 9, at 688–690 (noting that a prosecutor who wishes to
elicit a passive response from a jury will use a different style of narrative than a defense
attorney who wishes to elicit a more active response).
244. Edwards, supra note 5, at 9–13.
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Myth and metaphor provide characters, give those characters motives, and
identify the “right ending” for the story of the law.245 Thus, these myths and
metaphors again raise the familiar foundationalist/anti-foundationalist
debate,246 but now opened on yet another front. If unnoticed stories about
the law have unnoticed effects on how we analyze legal authority,247 we
have some important work to do. And to do that work, we will need a more
complete narratology of law.248 Questions abound.249 At the very least, we
need to clarify the relationship between stories and tools of formal
reasoning such as rule articulation, analogy, statutory interpretation, policy,
and stare decisis. Are stories unrelated to these more familiar analytical
moves, or does one precede and, therefore, constitute the other?250 Is
traditional legal reasoning simply the language we use to relate the end of a
story that began and lives still in the mists of narrative imagination?251 If
myth is the origin of reason, do we still need both?252 If we do, what roles
should each play?253 If each has its own role, how can we evaluate how well
245. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
246. Jane Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative? 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 173 (1997).
247. Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear, supra note 18, at 117; LARUE supra note 3, at
137.
248. Brooks, Narrative Transactions supra note 15, at 2; Richard K. Sherwin, Law
Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39,
51 (1994).
249. The resolution of these questions is far beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
important to mention a few of them in order to show how fundamental these questions are in
understanding the legal enterprise. See WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, chs.
3 & 5 (addressing many of these questions).
250. Ernst Cassirer believed that myths precede and culminate in linear thought and
understanding. Susanne K. Langer wrote that Cassirer’s “great thesis, based on the evidence
of language and verified by his sources with quite thrilling success, is that philosophy of
mind involves much more than a theory of knowledge; it involves a theory of prelogical
conception and expression, and their final culmination in reason and factual knowledge.”
Susanne K. Langer, Preface to ERNST CASSIRER, LANGUAGE AND MYTH (Susanne K. Langer
trans., Harper & Bros. 1946) (alteration in original).
251. If the outcome of a case depends, in part, on what story captures the court’s
imagination, judges badly need a well-honed narrative sensitivity. For unlike the telling of a
client’s story, the telling of the law’s story does not sound like what it is. Any court will read
a brief’s fact statement with skepticism, knowing that it is, after all, someone’s story. But in
a legal argument, a court may not recognize that a story is being told. With its narrative
antennae at rest, the court may be especially susceptible to unconscious narrative influence.
252. Lash LaRue wrote of our yearning for both stories and theories. LARUE, supra note
3, at 73. He wrote that if story “is one of the fundamental ways to understand the world, then
a good story does not need to be replaced by a good theory . . . .” Id. at 149.
253. We need rules and theories for good reasons—our hope for fairness and
predictability, our desire for certainty and our fear of an unknown future. Gretchen A. Craft,
The Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature, 102 YALE L.J. 521, 522 (1992). We want
them because they seem to be more easily tested and evaluated and because we have a lot at
stake when we ask legal questions. But, even after they have helped us craft a rule or theory,
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each role is performed in a particular rhetorical setting? For those who
yearn for a clear, articulable, and predictable legal method, these questions
may be difficult.254
This matter of evaluation raises the even thornier question of truth and
falsehood, whatever those terms may mean in the context of narrative. As
the New Rhetoricians have taught, the reality we perceive is not simply
observed and reported, but rather it is constructed through language.255 If
the New Rhetoricians are right, then it is a complicated question indeed to
ask whether a story is “true.”256
The topic of this article assumes a story in which the reported facts
(case holdings, statutory content, procedural developments) are true in a
historical sense,257 but that kind of truth does not resolve the question.258
Facts can be historically true, and yet the story they help to construct might
not be “true.”259 Stories are true or false, depending not so much on what
they say as on what they omit and what they imply.260 Since every story
both omits and implies some things and not others, every story is both true
and false.261 In fact, several alternative stories can each be “true” (and
“false”).262 How then can we tell when omission and implication cross a

we still need stories because, as Robert Cover taught, we need narrative’s ongoing “paideic”
reevaluation of legal norms. Cover, supra note 1, at 16; see also Edwards, supra note 5, at
42 (explaining that “rules are codifications of a particular narrative perspective”).
254. Baron & Epstein, supra note 246, at 145.
255. “[M]yth, art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the sense of mere
figures which refer to some given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical renderings,
but in the sense of forces each of which produces and posits a world of its own.” CASSIRER
supra note 250, at 8; “[L]anguage neither mirrors nor reveals truth; it defines or makes truth
possible.” Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking
Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 174 (1993).
256. “Because arguments are based on language, and because language is susceptible to
alternative interpretations, universal proofs are not possible.” Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric
Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ASS’N. LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 129, 139 (2006); see also WINTER, CLEARING IN THE FOREST, supra note 3, at 65–
66 & 123–25.
257. Even inaccurate historical facts can tell a story that is as true as any story can be.
“[T]he ratio of fact to fiction in a story does not correspond to the ratio of truth to falsehood
in that story.” LARUE, supra note 3, at 56. But when lawyers write briefs, they should get
their history right, and for our purposes here, we will assume that they have.
258. “Telling the truth in fiction can mean one of three things: saying that which is
factually correct, a trivial kind of truth . . . ; saying that which, by virtue of tone and
coherence, does not feel like lying, a more important kind of truth; and discovering and
affirming moral truth about human existence—the highest truth of art.” JOHN GARDNER, THE
ART OF FICTION: NOTES ON CRAFT FOR YOUNG WRITERS 129 (1984).
259. LARUE, supra note 3, at 121.
260. Id. at 56.
261. Id. at 14.
262. Id. at 56.
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possibly hypothetical line263 from truth into falsehood?264 Perhaps when we
talk about stories constructed from accurate historical facts, as we are doing
here, we should not ask about truth at all, but rather about completeness.
How many historical facts are accounted for in this story and how many are
omitted? How many contested interpretations of motive and causation are
accounted for and how many are ignored or obscured?
Without doubt, all stories are incomplete,265 but we should learn to ask
whether a particular story is so incomplete as to be troublingly misleading.
A story is incomplete if it omits significant historical facts that occurred
during the story’s plot line, as LaRue and Tsai demonstrate,266 or if it starts
too late or ends too early,267 or if its governing metaphor or narrative has
263. Rather than thinking of truth and falsehood as a binary dichotomy, we should think
instead of a continuum, asking not whether a story is true, but how true it is as compared to
how false it is. LARUE, supra note 3, at 128–29.
264. Id. LaRue admits the difficulty of asking the truth question, and he cautions us to
be careful with those labels. Id. Yet he ventures into this dangerous territory himself when
he writes that the “onward and upward” story of growth in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316 (1819), is a lie. LARUE, supra note 3, at 149 (“[W]e are tempted to tell sentimental tales
(the path of the law has been onward and upward), and thus lie, because we weaken and give
up before we look in all the places we should look.”); see also id. at 121–25, 153. LaRue is,
of course, referring here to stories in judicial opinions, where the writer undertakes a role
and a rhetorical task much different from that of the writer of a brief.
265. For example, Robert Tsai has written that stories of growth:
[P]resent a political tradition as a coherent and progressive whole, thereby playing an
important part in the continuation of the rule of law, but they occlude the naturally
complicated currents of linguistic development. An inordinate focus on the
refinement of rules may lead one to overlook the contradictions, discontinuities, and
reversals in the construction of the political imagination. As a result, the tale . . .
necessarily misses the heuristics and vocabulary that arose to make sense of
historical events. Within these vehicles of constitutional transformation can be found
not only the pooled learning of a people, but also loss and gain, convergence and
dissensus, control and resistance.
ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 49–50
(2008). I would add that stories of creation and birth, closely related to stories of growth, are
incomplete because they assume an end to the birth or growth process. In a birth or creation
story, the brief’s desired result is framed as the culmination of the birth or growth process. In
law, however, birth and growth never stop. There is no culmination. The law continues
growing and changing as history unfolds.
266. LaRue and Tsai effectively demonstrate the limitations of growth narratives,
showing the parts of history that are omitted or muted in such a tale. LARUE, supra note 3,
70–88; TSAI, supra note 265. LaRue has also critiqued narratives of limits and of equality on
similar grounds. LARUE, supra note 3, 41–48, 93–100.
267. Suppose, for example, that the right-to-life movement relies on the Divine Child as
its constitutive myth. The fetus (the Divine Child), is placed in mortal danger by forces
whose goal is to kill the Child. The Child is helpless, so the protagonists must protect it.
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been co-opted to produce a result far removed from its original intended
meaning.268 All of us are vulnerable to these kinds of omissions in the
myths through which we see the world.269 The more able we are to notice
that we are standing within a story, indeed, that we are characters in that
story ourselves, the more able we will be to ask what that story omits.270 We
could ask whether there are other, more complete stories—stories that do a
better job of accounting for important facts and crucial questions. That kind
of narrative awareness would make the lawyers and judges who do the
work of the law more skillful rhetors, but it would do far more than that. It
would provide all of us a freedom to think more broadly, deeply, and
clearly about the legal issues we encounter.271
CONCLUSION
This article has unearthed two master narratives and some unexpected
characters in the legal arguments from the landmark briefs in Miranda v.
Arizona272 and Bowers v. Hardwick.273 These legal characters and plots are
disguised in the routine language of law talk, but their impact is all the
According to the myth of the Divine Child, however, once the Child is saved, the work of
the protagonist is over. Seeing the abortion question only through the lens of the Divine
Child can obscure other important needs of the child—needs that arise after the abortion
crisis is averted, like infant healthcare and preschool programs. These needs are easy to
overlook because they lie outside the constitute archetype, which ends at birth.
268. For example, one could argue that Griswold's reiterated insistence that it is
preserving the intimacy of the marriage bed was co-opted and perhaps corrupted by Baird's
quick extension of the ban to protect all legal sex. See; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). Either there is a sense of
hypocrisy in the original use of the marriage bed metaphor, or the metaphor has been
harnessed to do work it was not intended to do. See also Steven Winter, John Roberts’s
Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 549, 555–56 (2009), in which Winter argues
against Chief Justice Roberts’s misuse of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) to
decide Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767–68 (2007).
See generally, Linda Berger, Of Metaphor, Metonymy, and Corporate Money: Rhetorical
Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV.
949 (2007); Linda Berger, What is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive
Theory of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 169 (2004). Berger shows how two well-known legal metaphors (the corporation
as person and the marketplace of ideas) have been co-opted to produce results originally
unintended.
269. Such interpretive “pitfalls and snares . . . infest every path that any lawyer or judge
could follow.” AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 3, at 287 (emphasis omitted).
270. “[W]e end up buying our own rhetorics as avidly as we sell them to others.” Id. at
176.
271. “[E]pistemological issues, with or without ideological dimension, almost always
have a consequence for how one goes about one’s business.” Id. at 218.
272. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 69.
273. Brief for Respondent, supra note 137.
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more important for that disguise. Because narrative’s power in the sacred
domain of legal authority is so effectively hidden, the law needs a wellhoned narrative sensibility, including a sensibility to the role of myth and
metaphor in law’s stories.
We need this legal narratology274 for several reasons. Certainly, in law
practice, an understanding of narrative’s powerful role in the analysis of
authority will produce more skilled advocates and more sophisticated
opinion writers. In judicial decision-making, an understanding of how
narrative creates and constrains legal argument will produce judges far
more skilled in evaluating competing arguments and selecting wisely from
among them.
A better understanding of narrative’s constructive role, in both senses
of that word, will help us understand the roles and limits of articulated rules
and other forms of traditional legal analysis. We talk in the language of
rules, analogies, and policies. That language gives us a sense of stability
and some hope of applying the law consistently.275 But myth and metaphor
create the narrative world that gives the law its life, and they provide an
ever-present measuring rod to be sure that the law is still doing its job.276
Finally, we need a narratology so we can recognize these constitutive
stories and be prepared to interrogate them bravely and without blinking. If
we do, we will see that, like the cowmen and the farmers of the Old
West,277 narrative and formal legal reasoning can be friends,278 and our
understanding and use of legal authority will be the better for it.

274. See generally Brooks, supra note 15.
275. I leave for another day the topic of how misleading this sense of stability and
consistency may be.
276. Cover, supra note 1, at 4–5.
277. OKLAHOMA! (RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 1955).
278. Edwards, supra note 5, at 50.

